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Wholesale Electricity Price Volatility and Price 




William Joseph Troy IV 





Due to high volatility and frequent price spikes in wholesale electricity market prices, market 
regulators often impose price bounds on auction and final market prices.  This paper applies a 
model-free intraday-range measure and ARMA-EGARCH(1,1) models to wholesale electricity 
price data collected from seven markets in the United States and Europe to measure and compare 
volatilities across the seven markets and the effects of exogenous amendments to price bounds in 
a subsample of three markets.  The paper concludes that the wider a market’s imposed price 
bounds, the higher the price volatility.  Conclusions also suggest that exogenous price bound 
changes have more significant effects in markets with tighter imposed bounds and that changes 
made to locational marginal price bounds have greater effects on price behavior than do changes 
made to energy offer price bounds.  Conclusions add to emerging research about the effects of 
price bounds on electricity price volatility and are relevant for policy makers and market 
participants concerned with price volatility. 
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1.  Introduction 
Since the liberalization of the wholesale electricity industry in the 1990s, electricity 
generators and consumers, risk managers, traders, policymakers, and academics have paid 
special attention to the commodity’s high levels of volatility.  Electricity prices exhibit volatility 
multiple times higher than that of other energy commodities (see: Ullrich, 2012; Higgs and 
Worthington, 2008; Dahl, 2015) like natural gas, crude oil, and coal, and are characterized by 
frequent price spikes.  In an effort to mitigate the potentially damaging effects of high volatility 
and price spikes – measures of market risk – market regulators impose bounds (price caps and 
floors) on wholesale electricity market prices.  I contribute to a nascent line of research about the 
effects of imposed price bounds on market price volatility by calculating a model-free intraday 
range measure as a proxy for volatility and applying the ARMA-EGARCH model specification 
to price data.  
I have gathered historical time series day-ahead wholesale electricity price data from 
seven markets in both the United States and Europe whose imposed price bounds differ.  The 
day-ahead market establishes, a day before, 24 market clearing prices for contracts with physical 
delivery of electricity the next day.  This paper finds, after calculating intraday range values, a 
positive relationship between the width of a market’s imposed price bounds and that market’s 
price volatility.  Further, ARMA-EGARCH model results suggest that a market’s price bounds 
change the degree to which different types of amendments to price bounds affect volatility.  
The order of this paper is as follows: Section 2 explores justifications for price bounds 
and offers a review of literature about their roles in wholesale electricity markets, Section 3 
provides a description of the data and its characteristics and the calculation and interpretation of 
intraday range in all seven markets, Section 4 describes the methodology and application of the 
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ARMA-EGARCH models along with major empirical conclusions, and Section 5 concludes and 
discusses implications of the results.    
2.  Price Bounds: Description, Justifications, and Related Literature 
 Table 1 below shows regulator-imposed Energy Offer (EO) and Locational Marginal 
Price (LMP) price bounds in effect for the seven markets, and the locations these markets serve, 
studied in this paper.  Market regulators also impose scarcity price limits and other bounds like 
Violation Relaxation Limits (VRLs) to clear market prices in rare instances of extreme 
demand/supply movements.  EO and LMP price bounds are more relevant during normal day-
ahead trading environments and are thus the subject of this research.  
Table	  1:	  Energy	  Offer	  and	  LMP	  Price	  Bounds	  
Market	   Location	   EO	  floor/cap	  	   LMP	  floor/cap	  	  
	  	   USA	   ($/MWh)	   ($/MWh)	  
CAISO	   California	   -­‐150/1,000	   none	  
ERCOT	   Texas	   none/9,000	   -­‐251/none	  
MISO	   Midcontinent	   -­‐500/1,000	   -­‐500/3,500	  	  
PJM	   Central-­‐East	   no	  floor/2,000	   none	  
	  	   Europe	   (€/MWh)	   (€/MWh)	  
Nord	  Pool	  	   Nordic	  region	   -­‐500/3,000	   -­‐500/3,000	  
OMIE	   Spain	   0/180.3	   0/180.3	  
EPEX	  Spot	   Central-­‐West	   -­‐500/3,000	   -­‐500/3,000	  
Source:	  market	  websites	  and	  e-­‐mail	  correspondence	  with	  industry	  professionals	  from	  the	  seven	  markets;	  
Information	  as	  of	  Oct.	  26,	  2016	  	  
 
I consider the OMIE market to have the “tightest” – or most restrictive – width of LMP 
and EO price bounds, followed by the Nord Pool, EPEX Spot, MISO, ERCOT, and CAISO 
markets, and the PJM market which I consider to have the “widest” – or least restrictive – 
imposed combination of price bounds.  
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Not all markets impose price bounds and justifications for setting and not setting price 
bounds differ.  Of the seven total markets, the CAISO and PJM markets do not enforce 
maximum or minimum limits on LMP prices.  Justifications for foregoing such limits include1:  
a.) Price signals: the market clearing price algorithm functions best with true price 
signals and market participants rely on accurate price signals when making investment decisions.  
Limiting LMP price behavior via price bounds perverts price signals and the overall efficiency of 
the market.    
b.) Laissez-faire philosophy: the market itself can and should determine the most efficient 
outcome of price.  All information is priced into LMP prices in the absence of price bounds and 
interfering in the natural working of the market can destabilize the market. 
c.) Other limiting mechanisms: LMP price bounds are redundant because other 
mechanisms like EO bounds and VRLs are triggered if the LMP price becomes too high in the 
course of normal market functioning.  
The remaining five markets in this study do impose LMP price bounds.  These markets 
put forth the following justifications for enforcing LMP bounds2:    
a.) No perfect market: the wholesale electricity market is neither a voluntary nor perfectly 
competitive one.  Consumers cannot exit the market when prices are exorbitant and there is no 
substitute for electricity.  Further, suppliers cannot differentiate among consumers based on the 
electricity reliability they demand.  Price bounds act to neutralize these market imperfections.   
                                                
1 Source: e-mail correspondences with industry professionals from the SPP (Southwest Power Pool) and PJM 
markets, provided in Appendix A. 
2 Source: e-mail correspondences with industry professionals from the Nord Pool, MISO, SPP, IESO (Independent 
Electricity System Operator, Ontario), and OMIE (Spain) markets, provided in Appendix A.   	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b.) Encourage market functioning: by establishing upper and lower bounds, market 
participants are aware that prices will remain within a known limit, which removes uncertainty 
and encourages a more natural functioning of the market.  
c.) Proper algorithm function: the market clearing algorithm operates most efficiently 
when upper and lower bounds are imposed on the parameters and avoids calculations based on 
supply and demand curves when upper price bounds are reached. 
d.) Other: markets implement price bounds to remain consistent with neighboring 
markets or because historical maximum prices have not reached the maximum limit.  In some 
markets these reasons are reasons enough to maintain price bounds.  
2.1. EO versus LMP price bounds  
Market regulators implement both EO and LMP price bounds – and not simply one – 
because there are instances wherein natural market forces push final LMPs above EO price 
bounds.  Consider first the following components of the LMP:  
 𝐿𝑀𝑃 = 𝑀𝐶𝑃 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 (1) 
Market operators oversee wholesale auction markets wherein electricity generators and 
consumers “offer” or bid quantities and prices of electricity to be produced and consumed.  An 
algorithm then matches the resulting market supply and demand curves to establish an hourly 
“market clearing price” (MCP) - the least expensive price which clears the market and is 
subsequently paid to (by) every supplier (consumer) of electricity.  In the process of delivering 
electricity to market consumers, at different locations called “nodes,” “zones,” or “hubs,” 
transmission line capacity limits may be reached (“congestion costs”) and a percentage of 
electricity will be lost in the form of heat (“transmission costs”), meaning that the final price 
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consumers pay – the LMP – is a product of the system-wide MCP plus other costs specific to a 
consumer’s location. 
It follows that the MCP is capped at the EO price bound.  However, when congestion 
costs or transmission losses are greater than zero, final LMPs may surpass EO price bounds such 
that other (LMP) price bounds then become necessary.  In this way, EO bounds prevent resource 
suppliers from exercising market power by limiting the price they bid to the electricity auction 
market while LMP bounds limit the final price of electricity at a specific trading location.  Both 
play important roles and are examined in more detail throughout this paper.         
2.2. Literature on price bounds and price behavior  
 Literature suggests that price bounds influence the investment decisions and behaviors of 
market participants, and ultimately the final prices, in wholesale electricity markets.  Electricity 
generators can only justify investing in new capacity for future generation if they are certain that 
they will be able to recover the costs of such investments.  Joskow (2006) explains that a 
“missing money” problem arises when the cost of producing electricity outweighs the revenues a 
generator receives from selling that electricity.  Price caps have the potential to worsen this 
cost/revenue gap because they limit how high price spikes can climb, a major source of revenues 
for producers (see also: Higgs and Worthington (2008)).  Zoettle (2008), Higgs and Worthington 
(2008), Deng and Oren (2006), Tishler, Milstein, and Woo (2008), and Ford (1999) also 
comment on the influence price caps have on limiting cost-recovering price spikes and therefore 
capacity investment.  In the extreme, when price bounds are too restrictive, electricity generators 
decrease capacity investment causing higher and more volatile electricity prices in the future. 
Robinson and Baniak (2002) studied the behaviors of electricity producers in the English 
and Welsh electricity pools and found that volatility under price cap regimes actually increased 
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due to price manipulation on the part of producers.  By increasing the price risk (or volatility) on 
electricity contracts they sold, producers were able to maintain their revenues under the price cap 
regime.  Gülen and Soni (2013) looked at the ERCOT market in Texas and found that there were 
more relative extreme price spikes under lower price cap regimes, suggesting that electricity 
producers were able to change their production behavior, in reaction to price bound changes, in 
order to extract more rents via price spikes. 
Simshauser (2014), in his research of price caps in Australia, goes on to suggest that price 
caps, when imposed on competitive markets, can disrupt their natural functioning.  Tishler et al. 
(2008) apply a two-stage, competitive electricity market model on Israeli electricity data and find 
that as they apply and tighten an imposed price cap, a reduction in system reliability follows as 
electricity outages increase.  Interpreted in this way, price caps have the potential to significantly 
influence final market and price outcomes. 
Further, the relationship between price bounds and price volatility has been (indirectly) 
studied in previous literature, with mixed results.  Tashpulatov (2013) applies an AR-ARCH 
model to prices in the England and Wales wholesale electricity market during different regulator-
applied price cap and divestment regimes and finds, among other conclusions, that the imposed 
price caps did lower the overall price level of the market but increased price volatility.  Robinson 
and Baniak (2002) and Gülen and Soni (2013) make similar conclusions about price caps and 
price volatility throughout their research.  On the other hand, research by Hobbs, Iñon, and Stoft 
(2001), Joskow (2006), Higgs and Worthington (2008), Deng and Oren (2006), Tishler et al. 
(2008) and Ford (1999) find that relationships between price bounds and price volatility are 
positively correlated.  Hobbs et al. (2001) use a simple model and historical PJM market load 
data to simulate the operations of different market structures and conclude that an installed 
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capacity (ICAP) market structure with imposed price caps functions reliably and with fewer 
price spikes and lower price volatility.  
Previous research points to the importance of price bounds in market designs but offers 
mixed conclusions about their effects on wholesale electricity price volatility, leaving room for 
further research.  My work extends beyond past literature by specifically exploring the direct 
relationship between wholesale electricity price bounds and price volatility.  In doing so, I isolate 
and examine the effects of exogenous changes to price bounds, study an extensive sample of 
seven electricity markets which allows for inter-market comparisons, and employ a variety of 
volatility measures simultaneously.  I do not ignore or treat negative prices as has been done in 
previous research (eg. by winsorization transformation).  To the best of my knowledge such a 
focused study of price bounds and volatility is absent in previous research, making my 
contributions both relevant and warranted.  
3.  Data, Descriptive Statistics, Seasonality Correction, and Intraday Range (IDR)  
The data used for the purpose of this research was collected from the Bloomberg 
Terminal.  Day-ahead wholesale electricity prices were collected from hubs – price points where 
electricity is frequently and liquidly traded – in four centralized markets in the United States and 
three in Europe: CAISO, ERCOT, MISO, PJM, the Nord Pool, OMIE, and EPEX Spot.  The 
Nord Pool is a centralized pool design, while the other six markets are centralized exchanges.  
All seven markets are independently operated and are some of the largest and most liquid in the 
world, making them good candidates for study. 
Price data for all markets are in two frequencies: hourly and daily.  In the application of 
the ARMA-EGARCH(1,1) models, hourly prices for the EPEX Spot, PJM, and ERCOT markets 
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were transformed to daily prices by simply taking the arithmetic average of the hourly prices 
over a given day.  Hourly and daily frequencies are applied throughout.   
Descriptive statistics of prices from the seven markets are displayed in Table 2 below.  
Electricity is a non-storable commodity meaning that prices are cleared in close to real time.  
Supply and demand curves are highly inelastic because electricity is costly and inflexible to 
produce and distribute, has no real substitute, and is a necessary good.  For these reasons, prices 
often exhibit high volatility, frequent large price spikes, seasonality, and negative prices.  
Statistically speaking, they exhibit mean reversion, stationarity, asymmetric movements, and are 
characterized by fat-tailed distributions.  
In Table 2, maximum prices are high and skewness and excess kurtosis values, in all 
markets except OMIE, are well above zero indicating frequent price spikes in heavy tails.  
Sudden shocks to inelastic supply and demand curves are reflected immediately in the price (no 
smoothing with inventories), often resulting in price spikes as high as 94 standard deviations 
above the mean in some markets.3  Positive skewness is explained by asymmetric price 
movements, or an inverse leverage effect – as opposed to a normal leverage effect in equity 
markets – where positive price spikes are more extreme than negative ones.  Note that outliers in 
the series do not bias and are maintained in model-free calculations though are later corrected in 
the ARMA-EGARCH(1,1) application.  
Negative prices are evident in three of the seven markets and are an increasingly common 
phenomenon in markets which allow them.  The addition of renewable energy to generation 
mixes has shifted inflexible electricity supply curves outwards, making negative prices more 
frequent.   
                                                
3 Author’s own calculation, using EPEX Spot market data 
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See Ullrich (2012), Knittel and Roberts (2005), Geman and Roncoroni (2006), Goto and 
Karolyi (2004), Escribano, Peña, and Villaplana (2011), and Lucia and Schwartz (2002) for 
exhaustive analyses of electricity price behavior including seasonality, mean reversion, skewness 
and kurtosis, and spikes, and appropriate model applications to such behavior.      
3.1. Correction for seasonality 
 Raw and seasonally corrected price data are used throughout the paper.  Wholesale 
electricity prices exhibit hourly, daily, and monthly seasonality: retail electricity use is higher in 
the early morning and evening than during nighttime hours (on-peak vs. off-peak hours) and is 
higher during the week than it is on weekends.  Electricity demand also varies with monthly 
weather patterns as consumers use heat in winter months and air conditioning during summer 
months. 
I apply dummy variables to correct for the deterministic component of seasonality in the 
prices.  For hourly data, I employ hourly, weekday, and monthly dummy variables to compute a 
seasonality-corrected price,	  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒4566748798.  For daily price data the correction is the same though 
without hourly dummy variables.  This approach follows the method of Pereira, Pesquita, 
Rodrigues, and Rua (2016), i.e.,  
 























where 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒6:;8 is the original hourly/daily price data in levels and 𝜑>,	  𝑖 = 2,…,24, 𝛿A, 𝑗 = 2,…,7, 
and 𝜓D, 𝑘 = 2,…,12 are the coefficient estimates for the hourly, weekday, and monthly dummy 
variables, respectively.  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, A.) Hourly, raw B.) Hourly, seas. corrected C.) Daily, raw D.) Daily, seas. corrected 
A.) CAISO ERCOT MISO PJM Nord Pool OMIE EPEX Spot  















Hub/Zone  NP-15 Zone North Zone Michigan Hub Western Hub SE3 Spain Phelix Hub 
No. Obs. 66600 51768 101448 103608 147432 81792 142344 
Max ($ ,€) 472.94 2635.64 472.29 949.08 1400.11 145.00 2436.63 
Min ($ ,€) -13.94 1.48 -70.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 -500.02 
Mean ($ ,€) 34.59 32.28 38.77 46.47 34.38 45.35 37.88 
Median ($ ,€) 33.79 26.36 21.43 38.96 31.62 46.00 34.43 
Std. Dev. ($ ,€) 12.46 59.54 21.96 29.34 19.97 16.59 25.49 
Skew. 1.90 27.21 3.30 6.12 18.29 -0.24 16.17 
Exc. Kurt. 39.42 926.52 25.88 96.23 1029.95 0.75 1074.44 
B.) 
Max ($ ,€) 465.37 2555.77 444.39 919.37 1390.38 140.42 2397.89 
Min ($ ,€) -13.85 -52.18 -75.06 -14.95 -6.36 -7.61 -494.87 
Mean ($ ,€) 32.26 16.08 22.83 30.50 32.71 49.78 19.08 
Median ($ ,€) 31.37 14.68 19.08 25.55 30.26 50.14 16.84 
Std. Dev. ($ ,€) 10.52 57.67 19.35 26.93 19.33 14.35 22.92 
Skew. 2.79 27.45 3.74 6.86 19.53 -0.13 21.05 
Exc. Kurt. 70.61 947.44 36.70 120.53 1138.76 0.63 1579.83 
C.) CAISO ERCOT MISO PJM Nord Pool OMIE EPEX Spot  















No. Obs. 2775 2157 4227 4317 6143 3408 5931 
Max ($ ,€) 126.39 483.55 367.06 558.74 505.68 93.11 301.54 
Min ($ ,€) 0.54 11.14 12.71 17.42 3.51 0.00 -56.87 
Mean ($ ,€) 34.59 32.28 38.77 46.47 34.38 45.35 37.88 
Median ($ ,€) 33.78 28.59 34.56 40.26 31.71 46.05 35.03 
Std. Dev. ($ ,€) 8.95 26.35 16.24 23.52 16.95 13.69 17.74 
Skew. 0.86 9.95 4.16 6.52 5.44 -0.36 2.18 
Exc. Kurt. 5.05 126.12 50.64 98.87 112.90 0.84 16.89 
D.) 
Max ($ ,€) 124.96 472.68 357.34 541.18 501.72 96.85 284.09 
Min ($ ,€) 7.50 -15.15 6.95 6.03 4.49 0.31 -74.28 
Mean ($ ,€) 35.71 23.81 33.43 40.99 35.32 48.06 25.54 
Median ($ ,€) 34.40 21.80 30.22 36.21 32.91 48.48 23.24 
Std. Dev. ($ ,€) 8.50 24.96 15.52 22.81 16.52 12.62 16.45 
Skew. 1.17 9.52 4.31 6.47 5.54 -0.14 2.32 
Exc. Kurt. 5.36 125.37 56.80 100.42 118.80 0.43 20.27 
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3.2. Intraday range (IDR) 
 Realized measures, like realized variance and IDR, are often used as valid proxies for 
measuring volatility in high frequency, financial data (see: Hansen and Huang, 2016; Hansen, 
Huang, and Shek, 2012; and Ullrich, 2012).  Following Frömmel, Han, and Kratochvil (2014), I 
apply an IDR calculation to measure volatility in the hourly prices of the seven markets for 
which data was collected.  The IDR is calculated by simply measuring the difference between the 
maximum price and minimum price within a given day: 
 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑦	  𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒8 = (max 𝑝8 − min 𝑝8),          𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 (4) 
where max pF is equal to the maximum price within day 𝑡 and min 𝑝8 the minimum price within 
day 𝑡.  For each market, IDR values are calculated over the original price series and an indexed 
price series, where the price at hour 17 of May 2, 2015 – a peak hour in a month with moderate 
temperatures for which there is data for all seven markets – is set equal to $(€)100/MWh.  The 
mean values of the seven hourly price series are different and indexed prices are used to 
standardize differences in scale of price movements across the series.  
Table 3 shows mean, median, maximum, and minimum values of the IDRs for the seven 
markets, over original and indexed prices of both raw and seasonally corrected price data.  High 
(low) mean and median IDR values indicate high (low) volatility.    
A comparison of the IDR statistics across the seven markets suggests that the width of a 
market’s imposed price bounds, as detailed and explained in Section 2, is a fairly reliable 
predictor of market volatilities: tight (wide) imposed price bounds generally correspond to low 
(high) IDR values.  Volatility of the OMIE market, considered to have the “tightest” price 
bounds, is consistently among the three lowest while Nord Pool volatility is consistently the 
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lowest.  The ERCOT and PJM markets, two of the three “widest” price bound markets, exhibit 
two of the three highest volatilities.  
Table 3: Intraday Range, A.) Hourly, raw B.) Hourly, seasonally corrected  
A.) CAISO ERCOT MISO PJM Nord Pool OMIE EPEX Spot  
Original series        
mean  27.72 61.52 38.39 44.36 14.70 28.25 42.10 
median 24.91 32.22 28.61 35.18 9.61 25.12 32.57 
max 461.17 2611.84 264.00 754.98 1361.43 137.93 2405.63 
min 7.26 5.93 4.32 6.12 0.60 0.00 5.91 
Indexed series        
mean  72.89 126.07 300.31 143.53 63.17 102.72 346.24 
median 65.49 66.02 264.55 113.83 41.30 91.33 267.85 
max 1212.77 5352.13 2449.70 2443.00 5850.58 501.56 19783.14 
min 19.09 12.15 43.50 19.80 2.58 0.00 48.60 
B.) CAISO ERCOT MISO PJM Nord Pool OMIE EPEX Spot  
Original series        
mean  18.88 62.61 32.50 37.22 13.16 21.79 32.97 
median 16.04 37.79 24.05 27.69 8.91 18.82 24.09 
max 450.99 2572.76 248.14 738.69 1356.34 125.22 2384.00 
min 4.84 7.21 7.07 9.76 2.62 5.09 7.41 
Indexed series        
mean  54.71 1318.20 252.96 267.50 47.20 58.58 396.00 
median 46.49 795.72 187.23 199.00 31.95 50.60 289.34 
max 1306.86 54170.66 1931.37 5309.15 4864.07 336.62 28635.57 
min 14.04 151.82 55.05 70.15 9.39 13.69 89.06 
 
Volatilities of the EPEX Spot and MISO markets fall within these two extremes.  The Nord Pool 
market, for example, perhaps owes its consistently low IDR values to its tight price bounds, 
greater market and consumer homogeneity, greater homogeneity of temperatures in the market 
region, and its being a pool design rather than an exchange.  The CAISO market, however, 
regularly exhibits some of the lowest volatilities as measured by IDR values despite its having 
wide price bounds.  Conclusions hold over original and indexed raw and corrected prices, 
suggesting robustness.  
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  Yet, given imperfections of the IDR measure outlined by Patton (2011) and the remaining 
ambiguity concerning the relationship between price bounds and volatility I apply ARMA-
EGARCH(1,1) models in the following section to better measure price behavior.    
4.  Exogenous Price Bound Changes, ARMA-EGARCH(1,1) Model, and Discussion 
At different points in time across the data, market regulators in the EPEX Spot, PJM, and 
ERCOT markets widened the space in which prices are offered and set both as a reaction to and 
to encourage changing market dynamics.  EPEX Spot market regulators argue that lowering the 
LMP price floor to allow for negative prices made the market more efficient, via more accurate 
price signals, and incentivized inflexible producers to invest in flexible production means like 
renewables.  PJM and ERCOT market regulators increased EO price ceilings in reaction to an 
increase in the occurrence of unusually high demand periods and rising fuel costs such that 
previous price bounds had become outdated.4        
I examine these three particular markets namely because regulators introduced known 
and pronounced, though of different scale and type, exogenous changes to price bounds.  They 
are also some of the largest and most liquid electricity markets in the sample meaning that 
conclusions about the effects of price bound changes in these markets are more likely to hold in 
other markets as well.   
Exogenous price changes naturally segment price data such that price dynamics can be 
measured before and after the price change.  The following price bound changes, shown in Table 
4, were exogenously imposed by market regulators:  
 
 
                                                
4 See: Negative Prices: Q&A prepared by EPEX Spot; FERC Order PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 153 FERC ¶ 
61,289, Docket No. ER16-76-000  
	   16	  
 
4.1. Methodology  
 The exponential GARCH model (EGARCH), a variation of the GARCH classification of 
models (Bollerslev 1986), was introduced by Nelson (1991) to model the conditional variance 
and mean of series, typically financial time series, which exhibit heteroskedastic behavior.  
Following Bowden and Payne (2008), Knittel and Roberts (2005), Frömmel, et al. (2014), and 
Liu and Shi (2013), I employ the EGARCH specification because it appropriately captures the 
non-constant variance, non-linear volatility behavior, and inverse leverage effect in electricity 
prices. 
4.2. Model specification and estimation: mean and conditional variance, ARMA-
EGARCH(1,1) 
 I indicate 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒456674879< as the seasonality-corrected price on day 𝑡	  with a deterministic and 
stochastic component:    
 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒456674879< = 𝐸 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒4566748798 𝛺8^G + 	  εF (5) 
The deterministic component, 𝐸 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒4566748798 𝛺8^G , explains the electricity price on day 𝑡 
based on information known in time 𝑡 − 1.  The deterministic component follows an ARMA 
process: 
Table 4: Exogenous Price Bound Changes 
Market Date Dummy  Price Bound Change 
EPEX Spot 01-Jan-08 dummy_exog1 Negative prices introduced 
       
PJM 11-Dec-15 dummy_exog1 Energy Offer Cap increased from $1,000/MWh to $2,000/MWh 
       
ERCOT 01-Aug-12 dummy_exog1 Energy Offer Cap increased from $3,000/MWh to $4,500/MWh 
 01-Jun-13 dummy_exog2 Energy Offer Cap increased from $4,500/MWh to $5,000/MWh 
 01-Jun-14 dummy_exog3 Energy Offer Cap increased from $5,000/MWh to $7,000/MWh 
  01-Jun-15 dummy_exog4 Energy Offer Cap increased from $7,000/MWh to $9,000/MWh 
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where 𝑐_ is a constant term, 𝜃> is a parameter for 𝑘 number of Bai-Perron breakpoint dummies 
(explained below) in the price series, 𝛿A is a parameter for 𝑟 number of exogenous price change 
dummies as specified in Table 4, 𝜑G, 𝜑f …𝜑e are parameters on autoregressive terms, and 𝜌G and 
𝜌H are parameters on moving average terms.  This ARMA specification agrees with previous 
studies (Frömmel, et al., 2014; Liu and Shi, 2013; Bowden and Payne, 2008) and accounts for 
remaining seasonality components in the price which were not captured via the seasonality 
correction applied above in Section 3.1.  
 The stochastic component, 𝜀8, is modeled as: 
 𝜀8 = 	  𝜎8𝑧8 (7) 
where the innovation process 𝑧8 is a Gaussian white noise process with mean zero and variance 
equal to one.  The ARMA-EGARCH(1,1) specifies the conditional variance of 𝜀8 as:  


















where 𝜔 represents the mean of the conditional variance equation, 𝜃> the impact of the 𝑖8r of	  𝑘 
total number of breakpoint dummies on the volatility of the price series, 𝛿A the individual effect 
of the 𝑗8r of 𝑟 total number of exogenous price change dummies on the conditional variance, 𝛽 
the degree of volatility persistence, 𝛼 the amount by which volatility increases regardless of 
whether a shock is positive or negative, and 𝛾 the asymmetric effect coefficient, whereby if 𝛾 > 0 
an inverse leverage effect is present in the series. 
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 Equation (5) is referred to as the “mean equation” and Equation (8) the “conditional 
variance equation.”   
4.3. Dummy variables: exogenous price bound changes, Bai-Perron  
 The first of two classes of dummy variables in the mean and conditional variance 
equations captures exogenous changes to price bounds listed in detail above in Table 4, where 
𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦7b5cA takes a value of 1 beginning on the day, and continues for the remainder of the series, 
on which the 𝑗8r exogenous price bound change was implemented.  The second class of dummy 
variables, following Bai-Perron (2003), is estimated by regressing the price series on a constant 
term using least squares estimation with breakpoints to determine the number and point in time 
of structural breaks in the series where 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦> takes a value equal to 1 beginning on the day on 
which the 𝑖8r breakpoint was identified to have begun.  Bai-Perron dummy variables improve 
model specification, thereby adding robustness to conclusions drawn about the role of exogenous 
change dummy variables.   
4.4. Data frequency, stationary, treatment of outliers, and residual distribution  
Daily price data in levels, versus hourly data, maintains the volatility dynamics of the 
prices but with less noise and fewer outliers, thereby improving the performance of the 
EGARCH specification.  Daily price data, corrected for weekday and monthly seasonality as 
explained in Section 3.1., is therefore used.  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) on the levels of daily 
price data for all three markets reject the null hypothesis that the series have unit roots, indicating 
that each price series is stationary and that the EGARCH model can be applied.  This suggests a 
mean-reverting tendency in electricity prices.  
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Because outliers are so few and pose little threat of biasing parameter estimates, I follow 
Garcia, Contreras, van Akkeren, and Garcia (2005) and do not correct for outliers in the daily 
data for the EPEX Spot market.  I do, however, set extreme price values equal to the 99.9th 
percentile in PJM and ERCOT market price data given the more frequent extreme outliers in 
these series.  
I impose the Student’s t-distribution for the distribution of the residuals of the price series 
process because it more efficiently captures the fat tails that are consistent with the distribution 
of wholesale electricity prices.  This agrees with Hua, Li, and Lizi (2005) and Huisman and 
Huurman (2003).  I also apply methods following Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) to ensure 
heteroscedasticity robustness and consistency in quasi-maximum likelihood coefficient 
covariance matrices and standard errors in the models over EPEX Spot and ERCOT price data, 
though not for the PJM model where residuals exhibit homoscedasticity. 
The three ARMA-EGARCH(1,1) models are estimated using maximum likelihood 
estimation with the EViews statistical package.  Results are presented below in Table 5, followed 
by a discussion of relevant conclusions.  Breakpoint dummy variables and autoregressive terms 
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Table 5: Parameter Estimates, ARMA-EGARCH(1,1) for EPEX Spot, PJM, and ERCOT markets 
Mean eqn. EPEX Spot PJM ERCOT 
c0 13.8951 [0.1469]*** 44.0098 [2.6100]*** 25.6551 [2.0586]*** 
θ1 13.2968 [1.5865]*** 8.8254 [3.3550]*** -2.8858 [1.2451]** 
θ2 -15.7030 [2.7580]*** -18.5661 [2.8970]***  
θ3 -12.8897 [1.3195]***   
θ4  -5.7588 [1.6557]***  
δ1 23.2125 [2.9506]*** -2.6130 [1.8798] 2.4686 [2.5723] 
δ2   -3.5167 [1.3244]*** 
δ3   -0.7627 [1.4148] 
δ4   -5.9242 [2.4967]** 
φ1 0.6588 [0.0076]*** 0.7328 [0.0125]*** 0.6304 [0.0401]*** 
φ6 0.1421 [0.0048]*** 0.0402 [0.0081]*** 0.1040 [0.0301]*** 
φ7 0.1390 [0.0041]*** 0.6458 [0.0327]*** 0.3006 [0.0370]*** 
φ8  -0.5643 [0.0334]*** -0.0903 [0.0269]*** 
φ9 -0.0518 [0.0014]*** 0.0945 [0.0115]*** -0.0291 [0.0132]** 
ρ1 -0.0528 [0.0089]*** 0.2060 [0.0167]*** 0.1747 [0.0504]*** 
ρ2 -0.0563 [0.0010]*** -0.5675 [0.0363]***  
Variance eqn.       
⍵ 0.1091 [0.0402]*** 0.2052 [0.0354]*** 0.1167 [0.0569]** 
β 0.8982 [0.0162]*** 0.9041 [0.0079]*** 0.8885 [0.0155]*** 
α 0.3042 [0.0308]*** 0.2838 [0.0265]*** 0.4393 [0.0626]*** 
ɣ 0.0273 [0.0135]** 0.2232 [0.0179]*** 0.1236 [0.0296]*** 
θ1 0.0876 [0.0219]***  -0.0763 [0.0414]** 
θ2 -0.1047 [0.0257]*** -0.0982 [0.0147]***  
θ3    
θ4    
δ1 0.0569 [0.0238]** -0.0187 [0.0228] 0.0108 [0.0383] 
δ2   0.0996 [0.0358]*** 
δ3   -0.0539 [0.0337] 
δ4   -0.0166 [0.0295] 
Model       
Adj R2 0.7112 0.7641 0.4038 
d.o.freedom 3.9164 3.9579 2.9378 
AIC 6.2948 6.3103 5.8652 
ARCH-LM F-
stat 
0.7433 1.7685 0.0585 
coefficient [(robust) standard error]; 1%***, 5%**, 10%* significance 
	   21	  
4.5. Empirical results: discussion and implications5 
 Parameter estimates and standard errors of exogenous price change variables, the 
variables of interest, are boxed in Table 5.  The exogenous change dummy variable in the EPEX 
Spot model is positive and significant in both the mean and variance equations, suggesting that 
the introduction of negative prices in that market in 2008 increased both the mean and volatility 
of wholesale prices.  Results for the PJM market indicate that the decision to increase the EO 
price cap in 2015 had no effect on either the mean or volatility of prices, given the insignificance 
of the exogenous change variable in both equations.  In the ERCOT market, the exogenous 
change in June 2013 (𝛿H) lowered the mean of prices and increased the volatility, given its 
negative and significant value in the mean equation and positive and highly significant value in 
the variance equation, while the June 2015 decision to increase the EO price cap lowered the 
mean of prices, and had no effect on volatility, given a negative and significant value of 𝛿K in 
Equation 5.   
 These results suggest that the wider a market’s imposed price bounds, as dictated by its 
combination of LMP and EO bounds, the smaller and less consistent the effect of exogenous 
price changes are, all else equal.  The exogenous price change in the EPEX Spot market – a 
market with a tight imposed price bound width – was significant and increased the price 
volatility.  The standard deviation of prices in the EPEX Spot market, depicted in Figure 1, is 
slightly higher in the period after the 2008 exogenous price change.  In the PJM and ERCOT 
markets, two markets with wide imposed price bounds, exogenous price bound changes had 
either inconsistent effects (ERCOT market), wherein some changes increased volatility and 
others did not, or no effects on price volatility (PJM market).  In other words, a market’s 
                                                
5 See Appendix A for model output tables and a plethora of other relevant statistical tests  
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imposed price bounds can to some extent determine the degree to which price bound changes 
will affect that market’s price volatility.   
 Results also suggest that LMP bound changes have more consistent and greater effects on 
price volatility than EO bound changes, all else equal.  The (significant) exogenous bound 
change in the EPEX Spot market was made to LMP bounds while the changes in the PJM and 
ERCOT markets were made to EO bounds.  LMP bounds limit final market prices while EO 
bounds limit auction bids – this difference is likely behind their differing effects on volatility. 
Other conclusions might be drawn about the direction of bound changes: the significant 
LMP bound change in the EPEX Spot market introduced negative prices, while the EO bound 
changes in the PJM and ERCOT markets increased already-positive price bounds, suggesting 
that negative bound changes have greater effects on price volatility than positive changes do. 
Across all three models, 𝛾 is positive and highly significant, confirming an inverse 
leverage effect in electricity prices noted in previous literature.  Moreover, a significant and 
positive 𝛽 coefficient close to one indicates high persistence in daily prices across all markets.  
Degrees of freedom values below four in every model also agrees with past literature that 
electricity prices exhibit fat tailed distributions different from normal.  Significant autoregressive 
terms indicate that electricity price volatility today is significantly influenced by electricity price 
volatility in previous days.  Low F-statistics on ARCH-LM tests and high Adjusted R2 values 
indicate that ARCH effects in the residuals are captured well up to seven lags and that the overall 
models fit well with the ARMA-EGARCH(1,1) specification, agreeing with Bowden and Payne 
(2008) and Frömmel, et al. (2014).   
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5.  Conclusions and Implications 
 Using two approaches to measuring volatility in price data for seven wholesale electricity 
markets in the United States and Europe, this paper adds relevant contributions to early research 
on the relationship between regulatory-imposed price bounds and price volatility.  Results 
indicate that imposed price bounds are important in determining the degree of price volatility in a 
market and the degree to which amendments to those bounds affect future price volatility.   
Model-free intraday range calculations over the seven markets suggest that the wider a 
market’s imposed price bounds, the greater that market’s price volatility.  Empirical results from 
the application of ARMA-EGARCH(1,1) models to price data in the EPEX Spot, PJM, and 
ERCOT markets offer two important conclusions: that amendments to price bounds have greater 
effects on volatility in markets where imposed bounds are tighter and that LMP price bound 
changes have more significant effects on price volatility than do Energy Offer bound changes.     
This paper underlines the advantages of using a simultaneous model approach – realized 
measures and empirical models – to measuring price volatility.  It also serves market regulators 
as they consider the role of price bounds in their markets and, in particular, any changes to those 
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bounds, especially in discussions of price volatility.  More generally, conclusions in this paper 
stress to all market participants, particularly those like risk managers and buyers and sellers who 
are concerned with price volatility, that price bounds do in fact matter.     
Further research should consider more advanced empirical models to better capture 
jumps and regime switches in price behavior and other exogenous variables like weather 
forecasts in explaining price volatility. 
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